

# What can money buy? The political consequences of material reparations

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## Abstract

Do material reparations change political participation? I argue that receiving material reparations can increase political engagement. I use a multi-method approach to show that surviving victims of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile who receive a material reparation are more likely to register to vote after being compensated. I substantiate this claim through content analysis of victim testimonies, qualitative interviews, and causal estimates that exploit exogenous variation in the timing of reparations. I find that reparations are capable of persuading resistant populations to engage in politics. Additionally, my results suggest that the noneconomic component of reparations payments is particularly valued by recipients. These findings suggest that analyses of the consequences of violence should account for experiences with transitional justice policies. From a policy perspective, the results are important for societies implementing transitional justice policies in the hopes of achieving long-lasting peace and preventing reversions to violence.

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# 1. Introduction

Do material reparations change political participation? This paper argues that material reparations increase political participation. The increase stems not solely from the economic component of reparations but from the symbolic value victims attach to it.

This project contributes to literature on transitional justice, legacies of violence, and political participation. First, I provide micro-level analyses of the political consequences of transitional justice by examining individual behaviors after violence. Transitional justice procedures have become increasingly common (Sikkink 2011; Olsen et al. 2010). As shown in Figure 1 reparations were administered 41 times between 1978 and 2007, according to the sole cross-national database of such policies (Olsen et al. 2010). Since 2007, additional policies have been implemented and fiercely debated in societies with turbulent pasts, including the United States.<sup>1</sup> That said, we have only begun to investigate how participation in transitional justice affects individuals' subsequent patterns of political behavior.<sup>2</sup> I find that transitional justice shapes political behaviors in post-violence contexts.

In Section 2, I review how my findings build on existing transitional justice literature. Next, I show that the legacy of violence can be altered by transitional justice. I advance a burgeoning body of work that focuses on the micro-level political consequences of violence exposure on behaviors and attitudes during peacetime. In section 3, I describe shortcomings of this scholarship, which is unable to explain heterogeneous political participation after violence. This literature has largely neglected transitional justice as a driver of political behavior in post-conflict settings, an omission that I show is problematic. I suggest that transitional justice is capable of redirecting the effects of violence exposure and heightening desires to engage with the state.

In section 4, I develop my theoretical approach to explain how reparations alter political participation. Implemented in pursuit of economic justice, reparations constitute a policy often invoked as one of several programs designed to recognize and address past injustices. I argue that compensation has an economic and noneconomic component that might increase political participation.


Section 5 describes material reparations in the Chilean case. Chile was the site of a 17-year long military dictatorship under the leadership of General Augusto Pinochet. Between 1973 and 1990, the dictatorship was responsible for 3,000 deaths (Rettig Report) and the torture of nearly 40,000 (Valech Report). Reparations were established for victim family members in 1992, after a truth commission report listed the names of those executed by the military regime. Direct surviving victims began receiving reparations after testifying before one of two truth commissions in 2005 and 2011.

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<sup>1</sup>For example, in 2017, the Canadian government made reparations available for victims of its "gay purge" (see <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/world/canada/canada-apology-gay-purge-compensation.html>) while reparations for descendants of slaves in the US has become a topic of debate in the 2020 Democratic primary (see <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/3/11/18246741/reparations-democrats-2020-inequality-warren-harris-castro>).

<sup>2</sup>See Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi 2016; Pham, Weinstein, and Longman 2004; Brounéus 2010.

**Figure 1:** *Map of reparations policies*



*Notes:* Map shading corresponds to number of reparations policies that have been implemented per country from 1970-2007 according to data housed by the Transitional Justice Database Project.

In Section 6 I present my empirical strategy and results. I utilize an additive, multi-method approach to examine the link between material reparations and engagement with the state. I show that surviving victims receiving reparations register at higher rates than nonrecipients. My data consist of individual-level reparations disbursements and voter registration records from 2010, before registration became mandatory, accessed through requests to the Chilean government. Next, I use a two-way fixed effects design and leverage exogeneity in the reparations approval process to estimate the causal effect of differences in the timing of reparations payments on voter registration. I find that reparations increase surviving victims' propensity to register to vote. Through content analysis of victim testimonies, I show that victims focus more on noneconomic repercussions of violence than economic, suggesting that material interests alone constitute only part of the story. I then draw on evidence collected through my interviews with surviving victims to highlight the symbolic meaning attached to compensation. Section 7 concludes with implications for reconciliation after violence and directions for future research.

## 2. Existing Scholarship

Existing transitional justice scholarship has primarily focused on politics surrounding its implementation (Huntington 1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Kritz 1995; Bass 2001; Sikkink 2011; Barahona de Brito et al 2001; Elster 2004; Snyder and Vinjamuri

2003/2004) and citizen preferences in post-violence settings (Samii 2013; Aguilar et al. 2011). Studies of its consequences are limited, leading many to call for additional research (Nobles 2010; Mendeloff 2009; David 2017). Research that does investigate individual-level consequences has generated a host of conclusions, suggesting that different policies can be therapeutic (Horn et al. 2008), promote forgiveness (Cilliers et al. 2016), and increase intergroup tolerance and beliefs in institutional legitimacy (Gibson 2004, 2006). At the same time, some research finds that participating in trials does not provide psychological relief (Başoğlu et al. 2005) but might increase trauma (Brounéus 2010) and psychological harm (Cilliers et al. 2016).

When it comes to reparations specifically, while some research documents that compensation does not factor centrally in victims' desires after conflict (Espinoza Cuevas, Ortiz Rojas, and Rojas Baeza 2003), others assert that reparations are a critical - though insufficient - component of transitional justice (Laplante and Theidon 2007; David and Choi 2005; Viaene 2010). Few studies consult with recipients directly, though Sveaass and Sønneland (2015) interview 37 beneficiaries in Argentina and find that reparations - to varying degrees - are considered problematic but retain symbolic value. My research contributes to this line of inquiry by considering reparations recipients in Chile and analyzing micro-level behavioral shifts generated as a result.

Though transitional justice scholarship exploring how victims perceive and respond to reparations is limited, other lines of research offer some insights.

Increasingly, scholars have argued that money has a symbolic component that may affect how victims perceive compensation and how it shapes their views of institutional legitimacy and democratic participation. In conventional economic approaches, money is an impersonal commodity with a quantitative interpretation. However, some have argued that individuals can attach symbolic meaning to money beyond its economic value (Belk & Wallendorf 1990; Goldberg & Lewis 1978; Krueger 1986; Zelizer 1994). This may be because, as Mickel and Mitchell (1999) argue, money can have symbolic attributes associated with (1) achievement and recognition, (2) status and respect, (3) freedom and control, and (4) power. Moreover, material transactions are embedded in social systems, and because of their interactional and relational nature, they can be used to create and reshape social ties (Carruthers & Espeland 1998; Zelizer 1989, 1994, 1996, 1998). How this manifests behaviorally might also be related to who distributes the money, why it is distributed, how it is distributed, and how recipients are determined (Mickel and Barron 2008). A large body of work further suggests that fairness and procedural justice concerns factor centrally into the way money is perceived (Levanthal 1980; Lind & Tyler 1988; Blader & Tyler 2003). In interactions with the criminal justice system, scholars have attached high degrees of procedural justice to stronger perceptions of police legitimacy and feelings of belonging, which is thought to spur democratic participation (Bradford et al. 2014; Loader 2006; Meares 2017). High or low degrees of procedural justice in administering reparations might therefore also have ramifications for political behavior and increase political engagement.

I advance these literatures in several ways. First, I consider economic and noneconomic aspects of money side-by-side and argue that the symbolic value of money is particularly consequential in the case of reparations. Moreover, I attach precisely mea-

sured behaviors to material benefits, going beyond the way money is perceived to estimate the way money shapes political engagement.

### **3. Puzzle: Heterogeneous participation after violence**


Many studies suggest that victimization increases political participation such as attending community meetings, voting, and political group membership (Bellows and Miguel 2006, 2009; Blattman 2009; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014; Bateson 2012). This “activation” school of thought, however, cannot explain variation in political activity among individuals with similar experiences during violence. The Chilean case is illustrative here. Figure 2 documents registration trends over time, divided by how an individual was affected by violence. In 1988, Pinochet held a plebiscite where voters had to register to participate. This led to a surge in voter registration, among victims and non-victims. Between 1988 and 2012, voters could voluntarily register to vote; conditional on registration, however, individuals were obligated to vote, making registration a close predictor of voter turnout in subsequent elections. Indeed, in the presidential elections held between the return to democracy and the institution of automatic registration, the percent of registered voters that cast a vote ranged between 86 and 94% (Contreras and Navia 2013). Of the nearly 40,000 registered victims of torture, roughly 70% had registered to vote by 2012, when registration became automatic. Though the majority registered soon after the transition to democracy, many individuals registered years later, as Figure 2 shows. Thus, individuals with similar experiences during violence demonstrate different political behavior in post-conflict settings, exemplified by registering to vote and the timing with which they do so. This empirical reality suggests additional variation that warrants explanation.

The pattern is not unique to Chile. Recent research questions the link between violence exposure and political engagement. Despite studies documenting an increase in political engagement after conflict, a meta-analysis showed that effects on voting and knowledge/interest in politics were not statistically distinguishable from zero in a random effects specification (Bauer et al. 2016). Indeed, not all studies document an “activation effect” among victims (see Balcells 2012 for the Spanish case and Marks and Goldsmith 2006 for South Africa).

Other studies highlight heterogeneous reactions among victim populations. Moncada (2018) notes that dynamic political interactions between victims and criminals warrant attention. In this vein, studies find that Mexican victims of criminal violence are most likely to be politically active when they are embedded in strong social networks (Dorff 2017) and that in Colombia, those victimized by state groups are less likely to participate than victims whose perpetrator was not linked to the government (Voytas and Crisman 2019).

The theme emerging from this line of inquiry is that the focus on activation and withdrawal among victims obscures the heterogeneous patterns in political participation that can shed light on complex dynamics after political violence. This literature has neglected the influence of participation in transitional justice policies. This omission is problematic, as transitional justice policies frequently constitute victims’ most mean-

**Figure 2:** *Cumulative density of voter registration trends over time.*



*Notes:* Voter registration rates among those 18 or older on October 5, 1988 (date of Pinochet plebiscite.) Dashed lines correspond to presidential elections. Red solid line is Pinochet plebiscite. Dotted lines correspond to local elections (mayoral) or Senate elections. Data obtained from Servicio Electoral de Chile (SERVEL).

ingful interaction with the state after incidences of political violence, and these policies often explicitly seek to reconstruct trust between citizens and their government. This project thus considers how transitional justice mediates the relationship between exposure to political violence and subsequent responses.

#### **4. Theory and Expectations**

Forms of political participation differ in what they require of citizens and what citizens intend from engaging in them. I distinguish between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized political activity. Institutionalized political participation refers to activities such as voting, that take place within the bounds of the formal political system. This activity requires intentional engagement with the state and behooves individuals to make themselves known to state entities. Populations who were victimized by state entities might be resistant to this type of activity given their disaffection with formal political institutions. Indeed, existing work finds that following instances of political violence, citizens express lower levels of generalized trust (De Luca and Verpoorten 2015; Kijewski and Freitag 2016; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2011), lower approval levels of political actors (Gates and Justesen 2016), reduced trust relying on institutions for protection (Ishiyama et al. 2018), and decreased trust in the national government (De Juan and Pierskalla 2016). I consider how attitudinal shifts such as these manifest behaviorally by exploring one example of institutionalized political participation: registering to vote. Registering to vote requires that an individual make oneself known and identifiable to the government. During periods of transition, it is also clearly significant a break with the past system of government, especially when the transition is from a dictatorship to a democracy where citizens elect their leaders.

In contrast to institutionalized politics, like voting, noninstitutionalized activity does not require individuals to engage directly with the state. Examples of noninstitutional political participation include protest behavior and writing and signing petitions. Though noninstitutional political participation is not the focus of this article, the link between reparations and this type of political behavior remains a topic for future research.

If voter registration is an example of institutionalized political engagement, how might individuals who have received material reparations change their patterns of this type of political behavior?

Because institutionalized political activity requires engaging with the state, it might entail a psychological cost among those victimized by state entities. Victims might resist state engagement, given that the state failed to provide citizen protection and itself perpetrated violence. Transitional justice policies like reparations instituted by the state may help alleviate this psychological cost. Further, it is also well known that political participation is costly from an economic perspective (Downs 1957), and an income supplement could help to offset this cost. In sum, material compensation could theoretically serve as a way to reduce the economic and/or psychological cost of political participation.

On the other hand, it is conceivable that reparations would not affect, or could even decrease, levels of institutionalized political behavior. For example, if levels of material reparations are small and do not sufficiently address victim grievances or even exacerbate feelings of injustice, they could further elevate the psychological cost of engaging with the state. This could be the case if victims and family members feel like reparations are “blood money” that do not adequately address their desires and needs. In this case, reparations could create a “self-undermining” policy backlash, wherein individuals would withdraw from the political system they see as unjust (Jacobs and Weaver 2014).

I argue, however, that even if victims and groups of victims feel as though reparations policies are inadequate or incomplete, the institutional nature of the policy might suggest that the formal political system is a way to enact change and to achieve victories for victims, spurring political engagement. This leads to my first hypothesis:

- *Hypothesis 1:* Reparations will increase political participation.

Reparations could increase institutionalized political engagement for a number of reasons. I distinguish here between economic and noneconomic channels. One or both of these mechanisms may be at work if reparations increase political participation, and I adjudicate between them with my empirical strategy.

Material reparations clearly have an economic component. This dimension can restore material losses suffered as a result of victimization. Being targeted with violence can lead to a reduction in resources, in the form of losing a job, having education interrupted, or missing rent payments during internment. These lapses might accumulate and cause reduced engagement in political acts. Reparations could therefore help make up this difference, offering a “development boost” allowing citizens to return to normal life activities, including those political in nature (De Grieff 2008). Existing analyses of targeted cash transfer government programs show that they increase voter turnout (De la O 2013; Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches 2012), though these programs were not directed toward victims of violence but rather individuals with low socioeconomic statuses. Still, if income increases drive political engagement, reparations might increase institutional political activity through this economic pathway. If reparations operate through an economic pathway, I would expect support for this second hypothesis:

- *Hypothesis 2:* Victims will discuss their harms in economic terms. Political participation will increase with the size of a reparations payment.

On the other hand, victims may increase their political participation because of the symbolic dimension of reparations. Compensation signals that the state acknowledges victims were wronged and that they deserve reparation. In this way, the noneconomic component of compensation provides individuals with important informational signals about their status and identity. It allows recipients to infer how they, and the groups they belong to, are perceived by the state. The existence of reparations can convey the message that victims are perceived positively by state authorities. At a

minimum, reparations might alleviate fear that victims feel toward the state and encourage them to participate politically. If so, the lag between receiving a reparation and registering to vote should be relatively short, since we would expect victims to internalize the meaning of a reparation soon after they begin receiving payments. This would concord with seminal theoretical work in transitional justice that suggests that the policies have conciliatory effects (Hayner 2001; Biggar 2001; Kritz 1995). If the noneconomic component of reparations drives participation, then I would expect support for my third hypothesis:

- *Hypothesis 3*: Victims will discuss their harms in psychological terms. Political participation will increase soon after they receive reparations payment.

An alternative explanation for a positive association between political participation and material reparations would be that the relationship is correlative rather than causal. In this case, politically active victims would be more likely to receive reparations, resulting in a positive correlation. I account for this possibility in my empirical strategy, taking numerous measures to test for a causal relationship.

## 5. Material Reparations in Post-Repression Chile

To test my expectations, I turn to the case of material reparations in Chile. The Chilean case provides an appropriate setting to investigate how receiving compensation is associated with subsequent political behavior. The Pinochet dictatorship from 1973-1990 left over 3,000 dead (Rettig Report) and tortured nearly 40,000 (Valech Report). Those affected by these crimes are currently eligible to collect compensation.

### *Registering to Vote*

Registering to vote in the Chilean system was particularly consequential. Registration was reopened in early 1987 before the 1988 plebiscite where voters indicated whether or not they supported an end to Pinochet's rule and a return to democracy. To register, citizens had to go to an Electoral Service office where a state employee registered them in the official voting registry. Registering to vote before 2012 was voluntary, but conditional on registering, an individual was obligated to participate in all subsequent elections. This requirement makes registration and turnout in subsequent elections prior to 2012 closely correlated as suggested earlier. Failure to cast a vote after registering resulted in being called before a local judge and a fine of up to \$220.00 USD.<sup>3</sup>

What did it mean to register to vote? The general population had been unable to vote for their leader since Salvador Allende was elected in 1970. For victims, this period coincided not only with their experience of violence, but a more general lack of outlets for political expression (political parties were banned), which could in turn generate a feeling of being disempowered as political actors. Thus, registering to vote in this context - and voting against Pinochet - could be empowering, as numerous interviewees

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<sup>3</sup>Exceptions included illness, being out of the country, being more than 200 km from voting place, or other reason deemed eligible by the local judge.

noted. For example, when recalling her registration to vote, one respondent told me: “For me, it was an emotional experience. It was so exciting...And when the “No” won, I cried and said ‘Finally, finally we are going to know what happened to our family.’”<sup>4</sup>

But it could also be risky, since voting constitutes a public act with a public record that includes personally identifying information. Even after Pinochet was ousted, he retained a political position and many of his administration remained powerful, creating the perception that the government might be hostile toward victims and that it could be dangerous to make oneself known. As an interviewee noted: “The return to democracy was full of agreements that let Pinochet and the entrepreneurs control everything. In the end, they tricked us.”<sup>5</sup> In a climate of fear and distrust toward political systems, then, registering to vote and subsequently voting was a unique but potentially risky way to express discontent with the Pinochet dictatorship and parties that sympathized with and supported his policies.

For the 1988 plebiscite, 92% of the voting age general population registered to participate. However, as Figure 2 shows, this pattern was not the same for victims. The gap between victims and the general population suggests that the former was initially more resistant to participate in institutionalized political activity.

### *Collecting Reparations*

Several truth commissions have taken place since the democratic transition. The first, the Rettig Commission, reported those who had been killed or permanently disappeared for political reasons. Their family members (spouses, parents, and children) were deemed eligible for monthly reparations payments.

This paper focuses on surviving victims, who constitute the vast majority of reparations recipients in Chile (92%).<sup>6</sup> Torture survivors lobbied for a truth commission to investigate non-lethal crimes. In 2004, President Lagos convened such a truth commission that served as the basis for eligibility for subsequent reparations payments to surviving victims. In 2010, President Bachelet reopened the commission, allowing more survivors and family members to testify about their experiences and begin receiving compensation. To be eligible as a surviving victim, individuals had to have been detained for political reasons and torture had to have taken place in one of the 1,200 official detention centers in Chile. Only those who testified could receive economic compensation. Victims who were listed in the Valech Report had to present themselves at their local *Instituto de Previsión Social* (Social Security Institute, hereafter IPS) office to begin receiving reparations payments, and 22,513 surviving victims received compensation as of 2018 (see Appendix H for time trends in reparations approval times). The schedule of payment amounts, administered monthly, is depicted in Table 1.

The Chilean case is an example of a pacted transition to democracy after state repression. The nature of the transition is closely related to the political context in the new democracy. The pacted transition has facilitated a persistent split among those who

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<sup>4</sup>Personal interview, conducted June 2, 2019, Buin, Chile

<sup>5</sup>Personal interview, conducted June 4, 2019, Buin, Chile

<sup>6</sup>Results for family members, however, are included in Appendix E.

**Table 1:** *Monthly reparation amounts.*

Category	Chilean Pesos	USD	% of min wage
Surviving victim (under 70)	\$184,407	\$259.84	46%
Surviving victim (70-74)	\$201,636	\$284.11	51%
Surviving victim (75 and up)	\$211,053	\$297.38	53%
Relative (1 beneficiary)	\$557,590	\$785.67	176%
Relative (>1 beneficiary)	\$780,628 total	1,099.94	248%
Spouse (>1 beneficiary; 40% of total)	\$312,251	\$439.98	99%
Parent (>1 beneficiary; 30% of total)	\$234,188	\$329.98	74%
Child (>1 beneficiary; 15% of total)	\$117,094	\$164.99	37%

Notes: 2016 amounts from *Leyes Reparatorias de Derechos Humanos Informe*. These amounts are disbursed monthly. Conversions via Google Finance, 20 August 2019.

support the old regime or who favor the new democracy. In fact, this cleavage has served as the basis for political parties that formed during the dictatorship or soon thereafter and persist today (Loxton 2016). Additionally, those describing themselves as left or right-leaning have a strong tendency to support or reject victim-centered transitional justice measures, respectively (Balcells, Palanza, and Voytas 2019).

When a transition is pacted, like Chile's, not only might public opinion remain divided, former elites may retain powerful roles in the new democracy. For example, Pinochet remained commander-in-chief of the army until March 1998. This regime "carry-over" can make it difficult to enact transitional justice policies, particularly those that assign blame or punish the former regime. Chile maintains an amnesty law that was established in 1978 by the military regime itself. This law has made it difficult for trials to proceed; Pinochet escaped punishment despite unyielding attempts domestically and internationally to bring him to justice. Amnesty laws are prevalent in post-repression societies and are common ways to protect perpetrators of violence. The Chilean context thus presents a useful study of how transitional justice policies operate and affect individuals' post-repression behavior even when impunity remains in place. The findings from the Chilean case may shed light on cases with similar pacted, non-crisis transitions.

In this context, where retributive justice was slow-moving and incomplete, reparations and economic justice comprise a unique recognition of past injustices for victims. In this way, the symbolism behind the policy is important for the expectation that it will increase voter registration. Even among victims who believe transitional justice to be incomplete and partial, institutional recognition can signal that the formal political system has changed since the dictatorship and can be a medium to pursue political goals.

## 6. Evidence on Effect of Reparations

To investigate how material reparations shape political participation, I study several questions. First, do victims receiving reparations and those not receiving reparations exhibit different levels of engagement with the state? Second, to what extent does receiving a reparation shape patterns of political activity? Third, why do reparations alter political participation? Utilizing different methods to answer these questions triangulates across different types of data, providing a richer picture of post-repression complexities than is possible with a single-methodology study.

### *Evidence on Registration Rates*

Do victims receiving reparations and those not receiving reparations engage differently with the state? I analyze the entire population of surviving victims who collect monthly reparations, relying on individual-level data documenting when IPS approved a surviving victim's solicitation for reparations. These data include the day of a victim's IPS approval, her full name, birth date, gender, and commune of residence. Table 2 documents summary statistics for these key variables. I received these data via a request through Chile's Transparency Law. To my knowledge, this is the first time these data have been analyzed systematically. I link these data to voter registration files, which include the date when individuals registered to vote until an electoral reform law made registration automatic. The voter registration data, formerly available on the Electoral Commission's (SERVEL) website, can be linked to reparations data by merging on an individual's name and national identification number.

**Table 2:** Summary statistics for demographic, independent, and dependent variables.

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Range</b>
Observations	22,513	
Age	68.4	29 – 102
Gender	17.4% Female 82.2% Male	
Provinces highly represented	39.8% Santiago 6.5% Concepción 4.9% Valparaíso	
Date approved for reparations	Dec. 2006	Jan. 2005-Jan.2018
Date registered to vote	May 31,1993	Feb. 1987-Sept. 2010

*Notes:* Information obtained via author request to IPS and historic SERVEL website.

To begin exploring the dynamics between receiving reparations and registering to vote, I plot a Kaplan-Meier survival curve for surviving victims who receive and do not receive reparations. I use this non-parametric estimator to compute surviving vic-

tims' survival function. It is defined as:

$$S(t) = Prob(\tau > t)$$

where  $t = 0, 1, \dots$  is the time in days and  $\tau$  is a random variable indicating whether or not the event of voter registration has taken place. It estimates the length of time unregistered recipients remain unregistered to vote after receiving a reparation.


To be eligible to receive reparations, victims had to testify before a truth commission. The final Valech Report includes a list of 38,254 individuals who were victims of torture. A number of these individuals subsequently passed away. According to IPS numbers, 24,302 individuals are still alive. Of these, 1,789 are *eligible* to receive a reparations payment, but have not gone to the IPS office to solicit and begin receiving compensation. Figure 3 plots registration trends among those who are eligible but are not receiving reparations (in red) and those who are receiving reparations (in blue).

As noted in the theory section, it may be that the most politically active victims are more likely to both receive reparations and register to vote. I take several measures to rule out that this drives my results. First, I plot only those who had not registered to vote when reparations policies began. Focusing on these individuals helps to alleviate the fear that those receiving reparations are particularly politically active; while this may be the case generally, I omit the most politically active individuals who would have registered to vote between 1987 and 2005 when reparations began. The plot shows that those receiving reparations register to vote at a faster pace in the time period after reparations begin (after 2005), suggesting that among these resistant individuals, reparations have an effect. Still, it may be the case that - even among the restricted sample of those unregistered when reparations began - because reparations are not randomly assigned, reparations recipients could differ from reparations nonrecipients in systematic ways. My subsequent regression specifications include individual-level and time fixed effects, which allow me to control for unobserved individual-level characteristics that might be related to the propensity to register to vote (i.e. interest in politics) and events over time that might influence voter registration (i.e. registration drives before elections). Finally, my identification strategy explained below allows me to isolate the effect of receiving a reparations payment; I measure voter registration an arbitrary number of months after an individual solicits reparations (by necessity after they have testified before a truth commission) but immediately after they begin collecting compensation. These strategies suggest that the effects I find can be attributed to material reparations.

### *Evidence on Effects of Reparations*

Does receiving a reparation shape political activity? I utilize the bureaucratic approval process which induces randomness in the date individuals are approved for reparations payments to consider how variation in timing influences registration patterns. I estimate a two-way fixed-effects specification, exploiting individual temporal variation in both my dependent and independent variables. To consider the individual-level impact of collecting compensation, I create a panel from 1987-2018 and track - for each individual - disbursement of reparations payments and registering to vote.

**Figure 3:** Survival plot of victims receiving versus not receiving reparations payments.



Notes: The Y-axis corresponds to the probability that an individual remains unregistered to vote while the X-axis represents days that have passed since an individual received a reparation. Red line corresponds to victims eligible for but not receiving reparations; blue line corresponds to victims receiving reparations. P-value from logrank test. Data received from Instituto de Previsión Social.

To make more precise causal estimates, I consider only those individuals who receive reparations and are unregistered to vote in 2005, when they begin (I consider various samples in Appendix A). This narrower sample mitigates selection concerns, or the idea that those receiving reparations are systematically different from those who do not.

After a victim or family member visits a local IPS office to prove her identity, IPS employees initiate a bureaucratic approval process. According to qualitative interviews conducted by the author, this process could vary in length, largely due to idiosyncratic considerations: IPS office workload (IPS offices also administer other pensions and benefits for workers and retirees among the general population), holidays, absences by certain employees, etc. Once approved, payments begin the subsequent month. The bureaucratic process that underlies reparations payments provides an entrypoint to analyze how differences in timing of payments - which arise not due to case-specific considerations but to exogenous factors - influence subsequent patterns of political behavior. Though individuals choose the day in which they solicit reparations payments, individuals are considered recipients only once approved and I use this approval date as a starting point, estimating the likelihood of registering to vote in the 12 months thereafter.


Therefore, I explore how timing in the receipt of compensation impacts registering to vote. I estimate a two-way fixed-effects specification, with fixed effects at the individual and month-year levels. Using these fixed effects accounts for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual and month levels and identifies variation in treatment (receiving reparations) within months and individual treatment history to estimate their effects. I consider alternative specifications in Appendices A and C and an alternative matching estimator (`PanelMatch`) in Appendix F and find consistent results across models, strategies, and samples. Per Equation 1, I estimate whether receiving a reparation is associated with registering to vote in month ( $t$ ) controlling for month-specific characteristics ( $\gamma_t$ ) and individual-characteristics  $\alpha_i$ . I allow  $f$  to vary from 0 to 12 in all specifications to estimate the contemporaneous and lagged effects of receiving reparations:

$$\text{Registration}_{it} = \beta \text{Reparation}_{i,t-f} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

This specification has the benefit of eliminating linearly separable time-invariant confounding and focusing on within-month and within-individual variation to isolate the effect of receiving a reparation. Time fixed effects reduce the likelihood that time trends in registration - unrelated to reparations receipts - drive my results. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are estimated at the individual-level.

Results are presented in Figure 4. The figure shows the coefficient on reparations received up to 12 months prior to registering to vote in any given month. Victims' receipt of reparations is associated with a 26% increase in the propensity to register to vote in each of the 12 subsequent months. These results are consistent with the notion that some of those previously unregistered to vote respond to reparations payments by subsequently registering. As was shown in Figure 2, large proportions of direct victims are resistant to engage politically, and my results suggest that reparations are

**Figure 4:** Individual-Level Fixed Effects Estimates of Reparations on Voter Registration for Surviving Victims Receiving Reparations. Coefficient Plot.



Notes: Sample includes only those unregistered to vote in 2005. Points correspond to  $\beta$  coefficients estimated from Equation 1. Heteroskedasticity Consistent Robust Standard Errors Clustered at the Individual level. Thick lines indicate 90% confidence intervals; thin lines are 95%.

capable of encouraging engagement among this population. Table A1 shows results from alternative specifications. Though the point estimates differ, the consistent direction of effect and significance of the results adds confidence to my main findings.

### *Evidence on Victim Concerns*

So far I have suggested that victims are more likely to become politically active in the 12 months following reparations payments, indicating that those resistant to engaging with the state can be persuaded by this transitional justice policy. Why might victim participation increase after receiving reparations? In the theory section, I described both economic and noneconomic mechanisms that could be behind this increase. As a first step in exploring these mechanisms, I turn to survivor testimonies. If registration rates were increasing for purely economic reasons, as reparations make up for lost income and provide additional resources, we would expect victims to frame their losses in material terms (hypothesis 2). If registration rates were increasing for noneconomic reasons, as reparations carry a symbolic message, we would expect to evince references to psychological repercussions (hypothesis 3). Prior to the truth commission for victims, victim-centered NGOs began collecting testimonies on their own. The Corporación de Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo (The Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of the Rights of the People, hereafter CODEPU) collected around 1,000 testimonies in the early 2000s to "illustrate the gravity and magnitude" of torture committed during the Pinochet era, urging the government to open an official truth commission, which later happened in 2004 (Rojas et al. 2002). When collecting the testimonies, CODEPU asked victims to provide personal information and recount their torture experiences. Specifically, victims were asked to provide their name, national identity number, age, profession, and date on which they were detained. They were then asked the following questions:

- Who detained you?
- Where did they take you?
- What type of torture were you subjected to?
- Who conducted the torture? For how long?
- Who was detained with you?
- Why did they say they were conducting the torture?
- What type of consequences has the torture had?

Of particular interest is the final, open-ended question, where participants elaborate on consequences they experienced.<sup>7</sup> CODEPU delivered these victim testimonies to

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<sup>7</sup>Translation by the author. According to the publication released by CODEPU, victims were asked "nombre, cédula de identidad, edad, profesión, la fecha en que la persona fue detenida. Se preguntaba ¿quiénes la detuvieron?, ¿dónde la trasladaron?, ¿a qué tipo de técnicas de tortura la sometieron?, ¿quiénes las practicaron?, ¿por cuánto tiempo?, ¿quiénes estuvieron detenidos con él o ella?, ¿en qué condiciones?, ¿fue sometido a proceso?, ¿qué cargos le hicieron?, ¿qué tipo de secuelas dejó la tortura?"

then President Lagos in a series of reports: the first one, containing roughly 500 testimonies was published in December 2002; the second one, containing an additional 500 testimonies was published in December 2003; and the third, which included denunciations of those responsible for torture, was published in May 2004. I analyze the first two, totaling 1,004 testimonies. These testimonies, published just months before the policy of reparations began, constitute a "pre-treatment" expression of survivors' thoughts about the harm they suffered and, sometimes, their desires for addressing it. To systematically analyze the way in which individuals frame their victimization, I perform content analysis of the testimonies included in CODEPU's report. This exercise serves two purposes: first, it is descriptive and facilitates exploration of victims' stated concerns and desires; second, it allows me to explore the prevalence of references to economic losses, which might suggest that reparations would help address lost resources and facilitate individuals' return to normal life and to psychological harm, which might suggest that recognition from the state would be meaningful.

As Figures A1 and A2 suggest, the bulk of testimonies recount individuals' arrest and detainment, describing where they were taken and the violence that was waged against them. Most testimonies also dedicate a final few words to discussing the consequences of torture and how individuals hope these crimes will be addressed through state policies. Since automated methods are applied to the entire corpus of documents, they focus on descriptions of torture, which comprise the majority of each testimony. To categorize references about the *consequences* of torture, I therefore read through each testimony and hand-coded whether it made reference to 1) economic, 2) psychological, and/or 3) physical harm (see examples in Table 3). I then summed up the total number of testimonies that framed victimization in economic terms. Additional examples of testimony segments that were coded as economic in nature are presented in Appendix B. Roughly 17% of total testimonies included references to economic hardships faced as a result of an individual's torture. Significantly more individuals framed their suffering in physical or psychological manners. Figure 5 presents a Venn diagram showing how individuals discussed their victimization. Note that 485 (48% of) victims did not refer to their victimization in economic, physical, or psychological ways but focused exclusively on the details of their detention and torture.

### *Evidence on the Economic Effects*


As a whole, the text analysis of victim testimonies shows that victims have noneconomic concerns. Though many of them detail economic hardships, the prevalence of physical and psychological content suggests that victims' losses are not confined to material considerations. To further consider the empirical implications detailed in hypothesis 2, I turn to quantitative analyses. If the economic explanation held true, registration rates would likely increase proportionally to the *amount* of money received. To test this notion, I utilize two strategies. Among family members, as shown in Table 1, the amount of monthly compensation differs according to an individual's relationship to the deceased victim. If the economic hypothesis were correct, we would expect that family members receiving higher reparations payments - particularly those who are the only beneficiary in their family and are a spouse or parent relative to a child - would show a greater tendency to register to vote. I test this notion by measuring

**Table 3:** Excerpts from testimonies corresponding to each category.

Category	Example text
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “The greatest suffering was borne by my children who were 6 and 4 years old. They were left homeless without money, without medical assistance, etc. Little by little my wife sold the furniture to buy food for them.”</li> <li>• “I lost my only job up to that point. After that, I had to work odd jobs. If I’d kept my job, I’d have a full pension and never would have had these economic troubles...”</li> </ul>
Psychological	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “I suffer from symptoms of pent-up rage, fear in the presence of <i>carabineros</i>, feelings of persecution, and insecurity in certain situations.”</li> <li>• “I have constant anxiety, depression, and nightmares.”</li> </ul>
Physical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Physical consequences include permanent pain in my neck, hands, knees, and feet.”</li> <li>• “I still have a scar in the left dorsal region as a result of the blows I received during my detention.”</li> </ul>


Notes: Testimonies from Corporación de Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo (CODEPU) “Testimonios de Tortura en Chile” accessed in the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos Centro de Documentación (CEDOC), Santiago, Chile.

**Figure 5:** Contents of victim testimonies.



Notes: Testimonies from Corporación de Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo (CODEPU) “Testimonios de Tortura en Chile” accessed in the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos Centro de Documentación (CEDOC), Santiago, Chile.

**Figure 6:** *Fixed Effects Estimates of Absolute Reparations Amount on Voter Registration. Coefficient Plot.*



Notes: Points correspond to  $\beta$  coefficients on amount of monthly reparations payment. Heteroskedasticity Consistent Robust Standard Errors Clustered at the Individual level. Thick lines represent 90% confidence intervals; thin lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

if reparation amount affects the propensity to register to vote. Results are depicted in Figure 6. In this analysis, I do not find evidence that higher amounts of compensation are associated with greater increases in voter registration.<sup>8</sup>

An alternative strategy analyzing this economic explanation relies on relative reparations amounts as opposed to absolute, since it may be the case that it is not the dollar amount that matters in and of itself, but how far that amount might travel in a specific Chilean commune. Since communes vary in their average incomes and cost of living, I utilize commune-level economic data to classify areas as above or below the average commune-level income. If reparations' effect occurs by providing an economic boost, then individuals in low income communities might increase registration rates at a higher clip than those in high income communities, since reparations payments are the same amount but would be worth relatively more in low income communities but relatively more in high income communities. The results, presented in Figure A4

<sup>8</sup>Though this analysis relies on a smaller sample size than those above, generating larger standard errors and less precise estimates, the point estimate of very near 0 does not offer support for economic effects.

show that those in low-income communities do not register at higher rates than those in medium and high income communities.

Combined with the evidence that victims do not tend to frame their losses in economic terms, these analyses fail to offer support for hypothesis 2 and offer tentative evidence that the noneconomic value of reparations - rather than the income boost alone - is an important part of the policy. Still, these findings warrant further research, since they suggest that there may be alternative discernible patterns between relative income levels and participation in transitional justice.

### *Evidence on Victims' Perceptions of Reparations*

If the economic explanation alone cannot account for the increased registration rates following compensation, we would expect victims to emphasize the noneconomic aspects of the policy. Hypothesis 3 listed several empirical implications consistent with this explanation. As argued earlier, the symbolic aspect of reparations can signal recognition. Victims might feel satisfied with reparations and view the political system more positively, spurring participation, or they might feel that the political system is a feasible way to address their additional grievances. If so, political participation may become increasingly appealing and would happen soon after receiving compensation, which is consistent with the results shown in Figure 4. To more specifically investigate how victims view reparations policies, I conducted 43 in-depth interviews with surviving victims and family members from August 2018 to June 2019. I recruited these interviewees through collaborations with three victims' organizations and human rights lawyers involved in domestic prosecution cases. Through these interviews, I sought to understand how individuals viewed the state's response to violence and how this shaped their attitudes toward the state and their engagement in politics. I asked these individuals a series of questions about their experiences during the dictatorship, with transitional justice policies in general, and as recipients of material reparations. Though my sample was not representative of the population receiving reparations, it draws on different classes of victims with different access to reparations and other transitional justice policies. I conducted interviews in the large metropolitan areas of Santiago and Valparaíso and in the rural areas of Paine and Buin, where many participants lived in poverty.

Among all interviewees, the reparations process was well-known and well-understood. Respondents knew precisely how much money they were paid each month and on what day. When asked about their satisfaction with the policy of reparations, many individuals highlighted that reparations were inadequate, such as the response below:

“The payments make you ask ‘What is justice?’ The Chilean state has not been concerned with being clear or deliberate in this regard. This money is not a reparation, because you can't put a price on the emotional cost of losing a father.”<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Personal interview, conducted November 4, 2018, Santiago, Chile

That said, while victims certainly do not see reparations as a complete response or one that fully addresses the crimes committed against them, some describe the symbolic value attached to reparations:

“Before, I thought that there would be no sum of money that can repair this. And while that might not be, everything helps, especially for people who were from poor backgrounds. But the value isn’t just economic; it is symbolic.”<sup>10</sup>

“The fact that there is a recognition from the state that this extermination policy existed [during the Pinochet era] and that it is symbolized by the benefits of the Rettig and Valech Commission, I think that is important.”<sup>11</sup>

From the qualitative evidence collected, surviving victims appear to view reparations as a favorable - albeit incomplete - policy. Additionally, they see reparations as reliable (they are delivered via direct deposit monthly) and many note that they were treated well when they visited an IPS office to prove their identities, suggesting that reparations are administered with a high degree of procedural justice. Together with the text analysis of victim testimonies, these data show that victim losses are not confined to the economic realm, and economic payments alone do not fully repair victims. That said, compensation appears to signify something to victims and is capable of increasing registration rates among those resistant to participate politically.

## 8. Conclusions

In this paper, I suggest that a specific transitional justice policy - material reparations - is associated with an increase in registering to vote among surviving victims. Because most reparations recipients have registered to vote prior to receiving compensation, this increase is concentrated among those resistant to political participation. I have highlighted existing work and qualitative evidence suggesting that a psychological mechanism might be driving this finding, as surviving victims view reparations as acknowledgment of the crimes they suffered and validity of formal political institutions as a medium to achieve victim gains.

The work presented here contributes to literature examining the determinants of political participation broadly and after incidents of violence specifically: participation in transitional justice can affect patterns in political behavior and should be considered. Additionally, it highlights an important insight: victims are not monolithic. This has implications for the way political scientists study violence as well as for policy-makers. The optimal policy for one group may not be ideal for another.

These results suggest that reparations can be a way to increase political participation, but that the noneconomic dimension of these policies seems to be more consequential

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<sup>10</sup>Personal interview, conducted November 7, 2018, Santiago, Chile

<sup>11</sup>Personal interview, conducted November 7, 2018, Santiago, Chile

than the dollar amount collected by victims. Increases in voter registration might stem from individuals' satisfaction with the policy and/or from their dissatisfaction with the policy and their desire to further the victim cause. Still, I have argued that registering to vote is psychologically costly for victims and therefore is a significant measure of political activity. My future research will further investigate the mechanisms behind this increase and the aims of heightened political participation.

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## APPENDIX

### *Appendix A: Full regression results*

Table [A1](#) presents results from various regression specifications and samples. Column 1 corresponds to Equation 1 and Table [4](#) in the paper. As robustness checks, I estimate month and regional fixed effects with the full panel (Column 2), with individual-level covariates using the full panel (Column 2, see Appendix C for more information) and recipients only (Column 4).




**Table A1: Modeling the Effects of Reparations on Voter Registration**

	Registering to Vote			
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-1</sub>	0.26*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.05*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-2</sub>	0.26*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.05*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-3</sub>	0.26*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.05*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-4</sub>	0.26*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.05*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-5</sub>	0.26*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.05*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-6</sub>	0.26*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.05*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-7</sub>	0.26*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.05*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-8</sub>	0.26*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.05*** (0.003)	0.006 (0.003)
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-9</sub>	0.26*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.05*** (0.003)	0.006 (0.003)
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-10</sub>	0.26*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.05*** (0.003)	0.006 (0.003)
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-11</sub>	0.27*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.04*** (0.003)	(0.006) (0.003))
<i>Reparation</i> <sub>t-12</sub>	0.27*** (0.007)	0.03*** (0.006)	0.04*** (0.003)	(0.006) (0.003)
Regional FE	No	Yes	No	No
Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual FE	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Individual Covariates	N/A	Yes	N/A	N/A
Recipients Only	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Post-2005 Only	Yes	No	No	No
Observations	2,487,018	8,419,862	9,088,948	8,419,862
Individuals	6,745	22,513	24,302	22,513

\*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Notes: Rows correspond to coefficients from respective models. Heteroskedasticity Consistent Robust Standard Errors Clustered at the Individual level in parentheses.

**Figure A2: Structural Topic Model.**



*Note:* Top 20 topics estimated from structural topic model on corpus of torture testimonies. Testimonies from CODEPU “Testimonios de Tortura en Chile” accessed in the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos Centro de Documentación (CEDOC), Santiago, Chile.

“I lost my job and was then unable to help my parents who depended on me...”

“The greatest suffering was borne by my children who were 6 and 4 years old. They were left homeless without money, without medical assistance, etc. Little by little my wife sold the furniture to buy food for them.”

“I lost my only job up to that point. After that, I had to work odd jobs. If I’d kept my job, I’d have a full pension and never would have had these economic troubles...”

### Appendix C: Alternative Fixed Effects Results

An alternative to the main specification in the body of the paper (Equation 1) is a two-way fixed effects model with fixed effects at the regional and month-year levels with individual-level covariates. This specification controls for individual characteristics and estimates the within-region effect of receiving a reparation.

Following Equation 2, I test whether receiving reparation is associated with registering to vote controlling for month-specific characteristics ( $\delta_t$ ) and linearly separable time-invariant regional characteristics ( $\gamma_r$ ). As before, I let  $f$  vary from 0 to 12 to estimate the effects of reparations over a 12-month period:

$$\text{Registration}_{i,r,t} = \beta \text{Reparation}_{i,t-f} + \gamma_r + \delta_t + \mathbf{X}_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

Figure 4 presents results from a comparison between victims who testified before the Valech commission and received reparations versus those who testified but have not received reparations (i.e. the same groups compared in Figure 3). The results, which are also presented in column two of A1 suggest that victims receiving reparations are significantly more likely to register to vote. To reduce the possibility that selection drives these results, A3. Columns one and three in A1 consider recipients only. Results are consistent with the main specification in the body of the paper; reparations increase the likelihood that surviving victims register to vote in the 12-month period following reparations receipt.


### Appendix D: Alternative economic analysis

To test the relative income explanation, I use data to categorize a recipient's commune income level. These data are obtained from Chile's (*Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional*), a survey administered by the Ministry of Social Development every 2-3 years. I calculate the average income in each commune and classify it as low, medium, or high, according to its placement in the overall distribution. I test the null hypothesis that compensation and commune-income level is unrelated to registering to vote. More specifically, as Equation 2 shows, I calculate the coefficient ( $\beta_1$ ) on reparations received in high-income communities and the coefficient ( $\beta_2$ ) on reparations received in low-income communities by individual  $i$  in month  $t$  again controlling for time-invariant individual-level characteristics and including month-year fixed effects.

$$\text{Registration}_{it} = \beta_1 \text{ReparationHigh}_{i,t-f} + \beta_2 \text{ReparationLow}_{i,t-f} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$


The results, included in Figure A4, plot coefficients  $\beta_1$  (green) and  $\beta_2$  (purple), the coefficients on high and low income communities relative to medium income communities, respectively. If the economic explanation held true, I would expect that  $\beta_1 < \beta_2$ . I would expect that those in low-income communities would have a higher registration

**Figure A3:** Fixed Effects Estimates of Reparations on Voter Registration. Reparations Recipients Only. Coefficient Plot.



Notes: Points correspond to  $\beta$  coefficients estimated from Equation 1. Heteroskedasticity Consistent Robust Standard Errors Clustered at the Individual level. Thick lines indicate 90% confidence intervals; thin lines are 95%.

**Figure A4:** Fixed Effects Estimates of Relative Reparations Amount on Voter Registration. Coefficient Plot.




Notes: Points correspond to  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  coefficients from Equation 2. Heteroskedasticity Consistent Robust Standard Errors Clustered at the Individual level. Thick lines represent 90% confidence intervals; thin lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Purple points and confidence intervals represent high income communities ( $\beta_1$ ); green points and confidence intervals are low income communities ( $\beta_2$ ).

rate than those in middle-income communities ( $\beta_2 > 0$ ), and that those in high-income communities would have a lower registration rate than those in middle-income communities ( $\beta_1 < 0$ ). However, Figure A4 shows that among surviving victims, the coefficients in high and low income communities are both positive, and that high-income communities are associated with an even greater coefficient than low-income communities (the opposite of what the economic hypothesis would suggest).

## *Appendix E: Family member results*

In this section, I estimate Equation 1 for victim family members. The results here show that family members who receive reparations appear to have lower registration rates, though the coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from 0. The smaller sample size of victim family members does not allow for the same precision as direct survivors, making the estimates noisier. The point estimates from the 12-month period suggest that victims and family members might respond differently to material reparations, as plotted in Figure A5 and presented in Table A2.. Receiving a reparation in the month before is associated with a 3% increase in registering to vote in each of the 12 subsequent months for direct surviving recipients, whereas it is associated with a 1% decrease for family members, though the latter does not reach statistical significance with my sample size. In Appendix B, I consider only reparations among family members *after* 2005, to test for the explanation that reparations had a negative effect early on, when only family members were receiving reparations but that the effect became positive in later years. The sign of the coefficient remains negative even among this subset.

**Figure A5: Fixed Effects Estimates of Reparations on Voter Registration. Reparations Recipients Only. Coefficient Plot.**



*Notes:* Points correspond to  $\beta$  coefficients estimated from Equation 1. Heteroskedasticity Consistent Robust Standard Errors Clustered at the Individual level. Thick lines indicate 90% confidence intervals; thin lines are 95%. Green points and confidence intervals represent direct surviving victims; purple points and confidence intervals are victim family members.


**Table A2: Fixed Effects Estimates of Reparations on Voter Registration**

	Registering to Vote	
	Family members (1)	Surviving victims (2)
$Reparation_{t-1}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
$Reparation_{t-2}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
$Reparation_{t-3}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
$Reparation_{t-4}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
$Reparation_{t-5}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
$Reparation_{t-6}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
$Reparation_{t-7}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
$Reparation_{t-8}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
$Reparation_{t-9}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
$Reparation_{t-10}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
$Reparation_{t-11}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
$Reparation_{t-12}$	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.006)
Observations	747,252	8,419,862
Individuals	1,998	22,513

\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01; \*\*\*p&lt;0.001

Notes: Rows correspond to  $\beta$  coefficients estimated from Equation 1. Heteroskedasticity Consistent Robust Standard Errors Clustered at the Individual level in parentheses. Column (1) estimates on family members of victims. Column (2) considers direct surviving victims who solicited and received reparations.

**Figure A6:** *Panel Match Estimates of Reparations on Voter Registration. Surviving victims (recipients and nonrecipients).*




Notes: Points correspond to PanelMatch estimates. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

### Appendix F: Panel Match Results

The two-way fixed effects specification used in this paper for the main results can yield biased estimates when considering multi-period dynamics (Imai and Kim 2019). I thus consider the main analyses in the paper in using a matching estimator that pairs observations based on covariates and similar treatment histories using the PanelMatch package in R using covariate balance propensity score matching (Imai, Kim, and Wang 2019). I use the universe of family members. For surviving victims and surviving recipients, I use a random subset of roughly 10% of the population for computational ease. Standard errors are computed using bootstrap estimation (n=500). Though the point estimates are somewhat smaller than those found in the paper’s main specification (Equation 1), the direction and significance of the effects persist, adding confidence to the notion that registration rates increase after receiving compensation.

**Figure A7:** *Panel Match Estimates of Reparations on Voter Registration. Surviving recipients only.*




Notes: Points correspond to PanelMatch estimates. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

*Appendix G: Additional interview information*

**Table A3:** *Descriptive statistics of interview subjects.*

Population	Total	Male	Female
Surviving victims	13	5	8
Family members	30	5	25

**Figure A8:** *Cumulative density of reparations approval trends over time.*



Notes: Reparations approval over time. Dashed lines correspond to Valech I and II. Data obtained from IPS.

*Appendix H: Trends in reparations approvals*